2002 Evolution and Reform Process: Difference between revisions
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==Background== | ==Background== | ||
ICANN was incorporated in 1998 | ICANN was incorporated in 1998 and entered into a [[Memorandum of Understanding]] with the Department of Commerce in November of that year to begin a joint project to manage [[The Domain Name System|the domain name system]] in a way that promoted the principles of stability, competition, private, bottom-up coordination, and representation of all views among the global and diverse community of Internet users and functions.<ref name="98mou">[https://www.icann.org/resources/unthemed-pages/icann-mou-1998-11-25-en Memorandum of Understanding], November 25, 1998</ref> | ||
===Initial Structure and Growth=== | ===Initial Structure and Growth=== | ||
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** Two additional Standing Committees - Security Committee, and Root Server System Operations Committee; and | ** Two additional Standing Committees - Security Committee, and Root Server System Operations Committee; and | ||
** Participation in Councils by self-organized forums, including possibly an At-Large organization for internet users. | ** Participation in Councils by self-organized forums, including possibly an At-Large organization for internet users. | ||
* Transparency and Accountability reforms: creation of the Ombudsman's office, and a "Manager of Public Participation" role. | * Transparency and Accountability reforms: the creation of the Ombudsman's office, and a "Manager of Public Participation" role. | ||
* Funding reforms - dramatically increase funding from governmental and non-governmental sources, including contributions for core functions and fees for services. | * Funding reforms - dramatically increase funding from governmental and non-governmental sources, including contributions for core functions and fees for services. | ||
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At the time of the ERC's work, neither ICANN's mission nor the organization's values were described in the bylaws.<ref name="feb02bl">[https://www.icann.org/resources/unthemed-pages/bylaws-2002-02-12-en ICANN Bylaws], as amended February 12, 2002</ref> In response to the call to articulate ICANN's mission, ICANN staff produced a document that described "What ICANN Does" "to provide a beginning point for that discussion by enumerating the most significant activities that ICANN does today."<ref>[https://archive.icann.org/en/general/toward-mission-statement-07mar02.htm ICANN.org Archive - "Toward an ICANN Mission Statement"], March 7, 2002</ref> The ERC created a draft mission statement and core values based on a wide variety of documents and agreements, most importantly the [[White Paper]], the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Commerce, the [[IANA Contract]], and the Memorandum of Understanding between ICANN and the IETF.<ref name="missionwp">[https://archive.icann.org/en/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-mission-06may02.htm ERC Working Paper on ICANN's Mission and Core Values], May 6, 2002</ref> The draft mission statement identifies ICANN's mission as "coordinat[ing] the stable operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems," including the allocation and assignment of domain names, IP addresses, autonomous process addresses, and protocol port and parameter numbers, as well as the operation and evolution of the DNS's root name server system.<ref name="missionwp" /> The working paper also identifies an array of "core values," although some of the listed values are more akin to operational mandates.<ref name="missionwp" /> | At the time of the ERC's work, neither ICANN's mission nor the organization's values were described in the bylaws.<ref name="feb02bl">[https://www.icann.org/resources/unthemed-pages/bylaws-2002-02-12-en ICANN Bylaws], as amended February 12, 2002</ref> In response to the call to articulate ICANN's mission, ICANN staff produced a document that described "What ICANN Does" "to provide a beginning point for that discussion by enumerating the most significant activities that ICANN does today."<ref>[https://archive.icann.org/en/general/toward-mission-statement-07mar02.htm ICANN.org Archive - "Toward an ICANN Mission Statement"], March 7, 2002</ref> The ERC created a draft mission statement and core values based on a wide variety of documents and agreements, most importantly the [[White Paper]], the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Commerce, the [[IANA Contract]], and the Memorandum of Understanding between ICANN and the IETF.<ref name="missionwp">[https://archive.icann.org/en/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-mission-06may02.htm ERC Working Paper on ICANN's Mission and Core Values], May 6, 2002</ref> The draft mission statement identifies ICANN's mission as "coordinat[ing] the stable operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems," including the allocation and assignment of domain names, IP addresses, autonomous process addresses, and protocol port and parameter numbers, as well as the operation and evolution of the DNS's root name server system.<ref name="missionwp" /> The working paper also identifies an array of "core values," although some of the listed values are more akin to operational mandates.<ref name="missionwp" /> | ||
The Mission & Core Values working paper received 9 comments.<ref name="missionpc">[https://forum.icann.org/reform-comments/mission/ ICANN Listserv Archive - Working Paper on Mission & Core Values]</ref> The comments varied widely in terms of support for the draft mission statement and values. Some commenters | The Mission & Core Values working paper received 9 comments.<ref name="missionpc">[https://forum.icann.org/reform-comments/mission/ ICANN Listserv Archive - Working Paper on Mission & Core Values]</ref> The comments varied widely in terms of support for the draft mission statement and values. Some commenters noted that the representation of all members of the multistakeholder community was not mentioned; rather the core values identified "inclusivity" of diverse viewpoints.<ref name ="missionpc" /> | ||
===Policy Development Process=== | ===Policy Development Process=== | ||
The results of ICANN's policy development process to date in 2002 was, in the view of the ERC, "at best uneven, with the predominant outcomes slow or exceedingly general or both."<ref name="pdpwp">[https://archive.icann.org/en/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-process-07may02.htm ERC Working Paper on ICANN's Policy Development Process], May 7, 2002</ref> In its discussion of the standards of decision-making, the ERC further described some of the issues facing ICANN's policy model to date: | The results of ICANN's policy development process to date in 2002 was, in the view of the ERC, "at best uneven, with the predominant outcomes slow or exceedingly general or both."<ref name="pdpwp">[https://archive.icann.org/en/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-process-07may02.htm ERC Working Paper on ICANN's Policy Development Process], May 7, 2002</ref> In its discussion of the standards of decision-making, the ERC further described some of the issues facing ICANN's policy model to date: | ||
<blockquote>The results to date are mixed. ICANN has been very effective in some areas, notably the introduction of competition at the registrar level, establishment of new TLDs, and the creation of an efficient, non-binding dispute resolution process. But in other areas ICANN has been less effective. In particular, ICANN has not always demonstrated the ability to come to decisions on issues of interest to some or all of its constituents, with the result that the consequence is often no action – by default rather than through a conscious choice of the Internet community.<ref name="pdpwp" /></blockquote> | <blockquote>The results to date are mixed. ICANN has been very effective in some areas, notably the introduction of competition at the registrar level, the establishment of new TLDs, and the creation of an efficient, non-binding dispute resolution process. But in other areas, ICANN has been less effective. In particular, ICANN has not always demonstrated the ability to come to decisions on issues of interest to some or all of its constituents, with the result that the consequence is often no action – by default rather than through a conscious choice of the Internet community.<ref name="pdpwp" /></blockquote> | ||
The paper went on to identify the challenge of reaching consensus as a primary roadblock to efficient and effective decision-making. Noting that the word "consensus" did not appear in the ICANN bylaws until the March 1999 amendments that created the DNSO, the ERC nonetheless accepted that consensus policy was an important concept, both in the spirit of ICANN's multistakeholder model and in terms of ICANN's [[Registry Agreement]]s.<ref name="pdpwp" /> | The paper went on to identify the challenge of reaching consensus as a primary roadblock to efficient and effective decision-making. Noting that the word "consensus" did not appear in the ICANN bylaws until the March 1999 amendments that created the DNSO, the ERC nonetheless accepted that consensus policy was an important concept, both in the spirit of ICANN's multistakeholder model and in terms of ICANN's [[Registry Agreement]]s.<ref name="pdpwp" /> | ||
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<blockquote>Thus, a reasonable solution would be to have ICANN seek consensus whenever possible in developing policies, through processes and procedures that insure that all views of those affected are heard and that are open and transparent, and then to allow the ICANN Board to decide the issue based on its educated perception of the best interests of the whole community. To ensure that the ICANN Board did not lightly disregard any policy recommendation from a constituent entity, ICANN's bylaws could require only a simple majority to accept a properly documented consensus recommendation from such an entity, and a supermajority (two-thirds?) to take action that was significantly inconsistent with such a recommendation. | <blockquote>Thus, a reasonable solution would be to have ICANN seek consensus whenever possible in developing policies, through processes and procedures that insure that all views of those affected are heard and that are open and transparent, and then to allow the ICANN Board to decide the issue based on its educated perception of the best interests of the whole community. To ensure that the ICANN Board did not lightly disregard any policy recommendation from a constituent entity, ICANN's bylaws could require only a simple majority to accept a properly documented consensus recommendation from such an entity, and a supermajority (two-thirds?) to take action that was significantly inconsistent with such a recommendation. | ||
This would preserve the incentive of all parties to work toward consensus solutions | This would preserve the incentive of all parties to work toward consensus solutions but allow the Board (assuming a Board selection process that produces a broadly representative Board) to exercise its good judgment. If a supermajority provision was included in the bylaws, and if an independent review process or some similar mechanism existed, there would be a review to ensure that standard was met.<ref name="pdpwp" /></blockquote> | ||
The ERC also outlined a uniform procedure for policy-making that is quite familiar to the modern-day policy development process: | The ERC also outlined a uniform procedure for policy-making that is quite familiar to the modern-day policy development process: | ||
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===ICANN Structure & the Role of the NomCom=== | ===ICANN Structure & the Role of the NomCom=== | ||
The working paper on ICANN's structure and the [[NomCom]] addressed Dr. Lynn's proposal directly and elaborated on the justifications for the structural reforms proposed in the President's Report. It spent far less time than the other working papers investigating the status quo and the need for reform, because "there appears to be widespread agreement that the problems identified in the Lynn proposal are accurately described," and so the ECR proposed to "accept that description as a base for examining proposed changes."<ref name="structwp">[https://archive.icann.org/en/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-structure-09may02.htm ECR Working Paper on Structure and the Role of the Nominating Committee], May 9, 2002</ref> As a result, the working paper is largely designed to call for responses to specific issues and elements of the Lynn proposal.<ref name="structwp" /> Under the ERC's view of the reformed structure, | The working paper on ICANN's structure and the [[NomCom]] addressed Dr. Lynn's proposal directly and elaborated on the justifications for the structural reforms proposed in the President's Report. It spent far less time than the other working papers investigating the status quo and the need for reform, because "there appears to be widespread agreement that the problems identified in the Lynn proposal are accurately described," and so the ECR proposed to "accept that description as a base for examining proposed changes."<ref name="structwp">[https://archive.icann.org/en/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-structure-09may02.htm ECR Working Paper on Structure and the Role of the Nominating Committee], May 9, 2002</ref> As a result, the working paper is largely designed to call for responses to specific issues and elements of the Lynn proposal.<ref name="structwp" /> Under the ERC's view of the reformed structure, | ||
<blockquote>In sum, this intermediate structure would produce seven ex officio Board seats – four voting (APC, GNPC, CNPC and TAC) and three non-voting (GAC, Security Committee and RSAC), all filled without participation of the NomCom. If we assume a Board with fifteen voting members – which seems desirable | <blockquote>In sum, this intermediate structure would produce seven ex officio Board seats – four voting (APC, GNPC, CNPC and TAC) and three non-voting (GAC, Security Committee and RSAC), all filled without the participation of the NomCom. If we assume a Board with fifteen voting members – which seems desirable since that is close to the upper edge of effective size – and the CEO retains a voting ex officio seat, that would leave ten Board seats to be selected by some other means.<ref name="structwp" /></blockquote> | ||
The "other means" was examined in the second section of the working paper. The ERC, noting that criticisms of the current Nominating Committee structure were valid, made the following recommendation for public comment and critique: | The "other means" was examined in the second section of the working paper. The ERC, noting that criticisms of the current Nominating Committee structure were valid, made the following recommendation for public comment and critique: | ||
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This proposal, in the view of the ERC, presented an opportunity for a Nominating Committee that would select board members through the lens of improving the common good, even if their own perspectives on the common good originated from a specific point of view.<ref name="structwp" /> The NomCom proposal, as well as all the others, were presented "in an effort to focus the community debate on more detailed and particular issues given the extreme time pressure that we are all working under."<ref name="structwp" /> | This proposal, in the view of the ERC, presented an opportunity for a Nominating Committee that would select board members through the lens of improving the common good, even if their own perspectives on the common good originated from a specific point of view.<ref name="structwp" /> The NomCom proposal, as well as all the others, were presented "in an effort to focus the community debate on more detailed and particular issues given the extreme time pressure that we are all working under."<ref name="structwp" /> | ||
The working paper on ICANN structure received twice the comments of the other two working papers: a total of twenty comments from eleven contributors. Some responses engaged with specific questions posed by the ERC, while others provided more generalized responses to the paper and its proposals.<ref>[https://forum.icann.org/reform-comments/structure/ ICANN.org Listserv Archive - Comments on the Working Paper on ICANN Structure]</ref> | The working paper on the ICANN structure received twice the comments of the other two working papers: a total of twenty comments from eleven contributors. Some responses engaged with specific questions posed by the ERC, while others provided more generalized responses to the paper and its proposals.<ref>[https://forum.icann.org/reform-comments/structure/ ICANN.org Listserv Archive - Comments on the Working Paper on ICANN Structure]</ref> | ||
==The Blueprint for Reform== | ==The Blueprint for Reform== | ||
After receiving the comments on its working papers, and continued refinement of its proposals, the ERC | After receiving the comments on its working papers, and continued refinement of its proposals, the ERC published its recommendations to the ICANN board, and summarized those recommendations in its "Blueprint for Reform."<ref name="blueprint">[https://archive.icann.org/en/committees/evol-reform/blueprint-20jun02.htm ICANN: A Blueprint for Reform], June 20, 2002</ref> The blueprint provided the following recommendations regarding each of the topic areas of Lynn's reform proposals: | ||
===Mission & Core Values=== | ===Mission & Core Values=== | ||
The proposed Mission Statement and Core Values were largely unchanged from the working paper, with some refinements to the core values based on comments received.<ref name="blueprint" /> | The proposed Mission Statement and Core Values were largely unchanged from the working paper, with some refinements to the core values based on comments received.<ref name="blueprint" /> | ||
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The proposed structure "tracks in principle" with the working paper on ICANN Structure, with some alterations based on comments received: | The proposed structure "tracks in principle" with the working paper on ICANN Structure, with some alterations based on comments received: | ||
====Board==== | ====Board==== | ||
* 15 directors, with two seats nominated by each of the supporting | * 15 directors, with two seats nominated by each of the supporting organizations, eight seats nominated by the NomCom, and a seat for the President of ICANN; | ||
* 5 non-voting liaisons, selected by the GAC, the [[IAB]]/[[IETF]], the RSSAC, the SAC (now SSAC), and the Technical Advisory Committee; | * 5 non-voting liaisons, selected by the GAC, the [[IAB]]/[[IETF]], the RSSAC, the SAC (now SSAC), and the Technical Advisory Committee; | ||
* Three-year terms, staggered so that one third of the voting members rotate annually, and with a limit of three consecutive terms; | * Three-year terms, staggered so that one-third of the voting members rotate annually, and with a limit of three consecutive terms; | ||
* Guidelines for the Nominating Committee to employ in selection of board members, which should | * Guidelines for the Nominating Committee to employ in the selection of board members, which should also be heeded as applicable by the supporting organizations: | ||
** broad functional diversity in areas of expertise relevant to the work of ICANN; | ** broad functional diversity in areas of expertise relevant to the work of ICANN; | ||
** geographic and cultural diversity; | ** geographic and cultural diversity; | ||
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The ERC proposed three supporting organizations: the Generic Names Supporting Organization, the Country Names Supporting Organization, and the Address Supporting Organization. The Protocol Supporting Organization would no longer exist; instead, the Technical Advisory Committee (described below) would be created to provide technical support and guidance to the board. It would be comprised of, "at a minimum...should they wish to participate, two delegates from each of the four organizations that currently comprise the PSO (the IETF, the ITU, ETSI, and the W3C), and three members with a strong technical background appointed by the NomCom."<ref name="blueprint" /> | The ERC proposed three supporting organizations: the Generic Names Supporting Organization, the Country Names Supporting Organization, and the Address Supporting Organization. The Protocol Supporting Organization would no longer exist; instead, the Technical Advisory Committee (described below) would be created to provide technical support and guidance to the board. It would be comprised of, "at a minimum...should they wish to participate, two delegates from each of the four organizations that currently comprise the PSO (the IETF, the ITU, ETSI, and the W3C), and three members with a strong technical background appointed by the NomCom."<ref name="blueprint" /> | ||
In | In addition to the SOs, the ERC proposed four advisory committees: the GAC (Government Advisory Committee), the TAC (Technical Advisory Committee), the RSSAC (the DNS Root Server System Advisory Committee) and the SAC (Security Advisory Committee).<ref name="blueprint" /> | ||
====Nominating Committee==== | ====Nominating Committee==== | ||
The Nominating Committee, as initially proposed in the working paper, was structured to provide the broadest range of expertise directed at the overall goals of common good and public benefit: "One of the underlying principles of the NomCom is that its very functional and geographic diversity would tend towards selection of Directors and persons filling other positions who are broad in outlook, individually and as a group, and not beholden to particular interests."<ref name="blueprint" /> | The Nominating Committee, as initially proposed in the working paper, was structured to provide the broadest range of expertise directed at the overall goals of common good and public benefit: "One of the underlying principles of the NomCom is that its very functional and geographic diversity would tend towards the selection of Directors and persons filling other positions who are broad in outlook, individually and as a group, and not beholden to particular interests."<ref name="blueprint" /> | ||
The proposal outlined the following structure and composition for the NomCom: | The proposal outlined the following structure and composition for the NomCom: | ||
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* GAC (1) | * GAC (1) | ||
* Unaffiliated public interest persons (4) | * Unaffiliated public interest persons (4) | ||
In addition there would be a Chair appointed by the Board and 2 non-voting liaisons, one from each of the RSSAC and the SAC. The above represents a workable balance among providers, users, technical and public interests.<ref name="blueprint" /></blockquote> | In addition, there would be a Chair appointed by the Board and 2 non-voting liaisons, one from each of the RSSAC and the SAC. The above represents a workable balance among providers, users, and technical and public interests.<ref name="blueprint" /></blockquote> | ||
The proposal identified a need for the ICANN Bylaws to require, to the extent feasible, geographical and cultural diversity and balance in order to support diverse and representative appointments to the board and other organizations. It also placed a single-term limit on NomCom members and a one-year ineligibility period for former NomCom members before they can be selected for service | The proposal identified a need for the ICANN Bylaws to require, to the extent feasible, geographical and cultural diversity and balance in order to support diverse and representative appointments to the board and other organizations. It also placed a single-term limit on NomCom members and a one-year ineligibility period for former NomCom members before they can be selected for service on the ICANN board.<ref name="blueprint" /> | ||
===Policy and Process=== | ===Policy and Process=== | ||
Drawing on the discussions generated by its Working Paper on ICANN's Policy Development Process, the ERC provided guidelines for policy development reform and refinements. The ERC emphasized that the board's role was not merely to enact "consensus" policies created by the SOs: "The Board has a fiduciary responsibility to make decisions on the basis of good faith judgment in furthering the public interest."<ref name="blueprint" /> Nonetheless, wherever possible, the goal of the board would be to foster an environment that seeks consensus in policy deliberations. The ERC's definition of "true consensus," "a policy acceptable to the great majority of those affected, with no strong and reasoned opposition," served as the benchmark for situations in which the board could only override the consensus by supermajority vote.<ref name="blueprint" /> | Drawing on the discussions generated by its Working Paper on ICANN's Policy Development Process, the ERC provided guidelines for policy development reform and refinements. The ERC emphasized that the board's role was not merely to enact "consensus" policies created by the SOs: "The Board has a fiduciary responsibility to make decisions on the basis of good faith judgment in furthering the public interest."<ref name="blueprint" /> Nonetheless, wherever possible, the goal of the board would be to foster an environment that seeks consensus in policy deliberations. The ERC's definition of "true consensus," "a policy acceptable to the great majority of those affected, with no strong and reasoned opposition," served as the benchmark for situations in which the board could only override the consensus by a supermajority vote.<ref name="blueprint" /> | ||
The procedural proposals for policy-making were similar to the ERC's working paper, suggesting that most policy development would require delegation of policy-making to the relevant SO, establishment of timeframes and scope, public comment opportunities for the draft recommendations and possibly the board's intended actions, and opportunities for the board to consult with other bodies such as the GAC regarding policy recommendations.<ref name="blueprint" /> | The procedural proposals for policy-making were similar to the ERC's working paper, suggesting that most policy development would require delegation of policy-making to the relevant SO, establishment of timeframes and scope, public comment opportunities for the draft recommendations and possibly the board's intended actions, and opportunities for the board to consult with other bodies such as the GAC regarding policy recommendations.<ref name="blueprint" /> | ||
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===Government Participation=== | ===Government Participation=== | ||
The ERC recommended that the GAC should be given the power to appoint a non-voting liaison to the board, each of the SOs, and the other ACs in the proposed reformed structure, and also to appoint one delegate to the NomCom. A GAC contact person for IANA function issues was also proposed, and the GAC's input was also requested in relation to the development a framework of accountability between ICANN and individual ccTLD managers that reflected the CNSO's global and cultural diversity.<ref name="blueprint" /> | The ERC recommended that the GAC should be given the power to appoint a non-voting liaison to the board, each of the SOs, and the other ACs in the proposed reformed structure, and also to appoint one delegate to the NomCom. A GAC contact person for IANA function issues was also proposed, and the GAC's input was also requested in relation to the development of a framework of accountability between ICANN and individual ccTLD managers that reflected the CNSO's global and cultural diversity.<ref name="blueprint" /> | ||
===Funding=== | ===Funding=== | ||
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===Public Comment and Board Action at ICANN 13=== | ===Public Comment and Board Action at ICANN 13=== | ||
At [[ICANN 13]] in Bucharest, the public forum provided an opportunity for feedback on the Blueprint for Reform.<ref>[https://archive.icann.org/en/meetings/bucharest/captioning-afternoon-27jun02.htm ICANN.org Archives - Public Forum Transcript], July 27, 2002 (Afternoon Session)</ref> The comments provided were extensive | At [[ICANN 13]] in Bucharest, the public forum provided an opportunity for feedback on the Blueprint for Reform.<ref>[https://archive.icann.org/en/meetings/bucharest/captioning-afternoon-27jun02.htm ICANN.org Archives - Public Forum Transcript], July 27, 2002 (Afternoon Session)</ref> The comments provided were extensive and addressed all areas of the Blueprint. At the board meeting in Bucharest, the board discussed a proposed set of resolutions regarding the Blueprint and made some amendments and changes based on public comments and board member feedback. Noting that "it is now time to move forward with implementation with confidence that while the Blueprint may not satisfy everyone, it provides the right foundation on which ICANN can build for the future," the board passed the following resolutions: | ||
* the board adopted and endorsed the Blueprint for Reform; | * the board adopted and endorsed the Blueprint for Reform; | ||
* the ERC was instructed to engage in further implementation and transition work based on the blueprint and with the input of the ICANN community, and propose implementation recommendations in time for public and board deliberation and action at [[ICANN 14]] in Shanghai; | * the ERC was instructed to engage in further implementation and transition work based on the blueprint and with the input of the ICANN community, and propose implementation recommendations in time for public and board deliberation and action at [[ICANN 14]] in Shanghai; | ||
* the ICANN President was instructed to provide all necessary assistance to the ERC; | * the ICANN President was instructed to provide all necessary assistance to the ERC; | ||
* the board took note of several issues raised by the community | * the board took note of several issues raised by the community and instructed the ERC to "take due account of these issues as it moves forward in the implementation process, namely, the need to: | ||
** devise and incorporate specific measures to ensure, to the extent feasible, geographic and cultural diversity in all parts of ICANN structure, which have been key core values of ICANN since its inception, and remain so today, as expressed in the ERC Blueprint for Reform; | ** devise and incorporate specific measures to ensure, to the extent feasible, geographic and cultural diversity in all parts of the ICANN structure, which have been key core values of ICANN since its inception, and remain so today, as expressed in the ERC Blueprint for Reform; | ||
** consider the creation of an At Large Advisory Committee as a potential vehicle for informed participation in ICANN by the broad user community; | ** consider the creation of an At Large Advisory Committee as a potential vehicle for informed participation in ICANN by the broad user community; | ||
** ensure that the composition and operation of the Nominating Committee in fact represents a balance among all segments of the Internet community; | ** ensure that the composition and operation of the Nominating Committee in fact represents a balance among all segments of the Internet community; | ||
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At its regular meeting in Montreal on June 26, the board approved the amended bylaws<ref>[https://www.icann.org/minutes/minutes-appa-26jun03.htm Board Meeting Minutes, Appendix A - Proposed Amended Bylaws], June 26, 2003</ref> and created a "launching group" to assist in the creation and launch of the ccNSO.<ref>[https://www.icann.org/resources/board-material/minutes-2003-06-26-en Board Meeting Minutes], June 26 2003</ref> | At its regular meeting in Montreal on June 26, the board approved the amended bylaws<ref>[https://www.icann.org/minutes/minutes-appa-26jun03.htm Board Meeting Minutes, Appendix A - Proposed Amended Bylaws], June 26, 2003</ref> and created a "launching group" to assist in the creation and launch of the ccNSO.<ref>[https://www.icann.org/resources/board-material/minutes-2003-06-26-en Board Meeting Minutes], June 26 2003</ref> | ||
At ICANN 14, the ERC | At ICANN 14, the ERC noted that there were two outstanding projects - the development of the Transition Article and the ongoing work of developing the ccSNO structure and procedures.<ref name="14resos" /> With the completion of the ccNSO project, the work of the ERC was complete. No final report was issued by the ERC to that effect. It is presumed that the committee was dissolved either informally at a board meeting, or at the end of 2003 by operation of board resolution 02.148.<ref name="15resos" /> | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist}} | {{reflist}} | ||